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ABSTRACT 
 This experiment investigated the processes underlying similarity-based 
free categorization. Of particular interest was how temporal distance between 
similar objects affects the likelihood that people will put them into the same novel 
category. Participants engaged in a free categorization task referred to as 
binomial labeling. This task required participants to generate a two-part label (A1, 
B1, C1, etc.) indicating family (superordinate) and species (subordinate) levels of 
categorization for each object in a visual display. Participants were shown the 
objects one at a time in a sequential presentation; after labeling each object, they 
were asked to describe the similarity between that object and previous objects by 
selecting one of five choices from a drop down menu. Our main prediction was 
that temporal distance should affect categorization, specifically, that people 
should be less likely to give two identical objects the same category label the 
farther apart they are shown in the display. The primary question being 
addressed in this study was whether the effects of distance are due to a 
decreased likelihood of remembering the first object when labeling the second 
(what we refer to as a stage 1 or sampling effect) or to factors during the actual 
comparison itself (a stage 2 or decision effect)?  Our results showed a significant 
effect of distance on both the likelihood of giving identical objects the same label 
as well as on the likelihood of mentioning the first object when labeling the 
second object in an identical pair. Specifically, as the distance between two 
identical objects increased, the likelihood of giving them the same label, as well 
iv 
as mentioning their similarity, both decreased. Importantly, the decreased 
probability of giving the second object the same label seemed entirely due to the 
decreased probability of remembering (sampling) the first object, as indicated by 
the menu responses. These results provide strong support for the idea that the 
effect of temporal distance on free categorization is mainly due to stage 1 factors, 
specifically to its effect on the availability of the first instance in memory when 
labeling the second. No strong evidence was found in this experiment supporting 
a separate distance effect at the comparison-decision stage (i.e., stage 2). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Literature Review 
 The ability to quickly and effectively discriminate between categories is 
fundamental to human intelligence, and understanding how such categories are 
acquired from experience has been the focus of much research within cognitive 
psychology. Obviously, not all categories are learned in the same manner.  Many 
are taught to us directly by parents and teachers, while others appear to be 
learned incidentally, through observation and interaction. Traditionally, 
researchers have distinguished between two major forms of category learning.  
Supervised learning refers to situations in which the learner is provided with 
classification feedback in order to acquire a specific category. On the other hand, 
unsupervised learning tasks include no feedback, leaving the learner to generate 
their own criteria for creating new categories. An important example of such 
unsupervised learning is the acquisition of complex language systems, which 
occurs relatively effortlessly through mere exposure and minimal feedback.  
Unsupervised category learning is of particular relevance to many "real-world" 
situations in which people learn to distinguish between novel stimuli rapidly and 
accurately, even without corrective feedback or supplemental guidance. 
 Despite the obvious importance of unsupervised learning, the vast 
majority of research on categories has focused on supervised learning.    
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Researchers seeking to understand the processes involved in category learning 
have often used supervised categorization tasks to test specific predictions and 
models. In these tasks, researchers ask participants to identify specific 
categories in order to test the conditions under which sensitivity to certain 
structures is demonstrated, often with the aim of testing specific computational 
models of learning (e.g.,Posner & Keele, 1968; Medin & Schaffer, 1978).  
Research on supervised learning can provide useful information regarding the 
limitations and capacities of human learning, as well as insight into some of the 
challenges faced when people must learn abstract or difficult concepts. However, 
it has limited applicability to many common, natural learning scenarios in which 
little if any direct feedback is available to guide the learning process.  
 One difficulty with much of the research on supervised learning is that the 
kinds of category structures people are asked to acquire are often highly artificial 
or unnatural.  Such structures are learnable in supervised tasks because the 
experimenter provides feedback to help people learn to correctly classify each 
stimulus object. One could even argue that supervised tasks discriminate against 
the use of psychologically "natural" category structures, as researchers must use 
at least moderately difficult-to-acquire categories in order to produce measurable 
differences in learning rates between different experimental conditions.  In other 
words, highly natural or learnable categories might be acquired so quickly and 
effortlessly in this task that ceiling effects would mask any differences that the 
researchers were interested in measuring.  This means that the kinds of category 
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structures that are best-suited to studies of learning- with-feedback are likely to 
be unlearnable without it. 
 In contrast to supervised learning, in which even completely arbitrary 
categories are learnable, the issue of what makes a psychologically good or 
natural category is much more central to investigations of unsupervised learning.   
This is due to the fact that people must discover categories for themselves in 
unsupervised tasks, meaning that some sort of relatively obvious category 
structure must be present in the stimulus set for them to find.  In this sense, one 
could argue that unsupervised tasks like free sorting more closely resemble 
natural category learning than traditional supervised learning tasks. Given the 
obvious prevalence and importance of unsupervised learning in the real world, 
unsupervised tasks such as free sorting may allow us to address several 
fundamental questions regarding how humans define categories and how such 
categories are acquired in everyday life. 
 In this thesis, I began by assuming that there should be a close 
relationship between the psychological goodness or naturalness of a category 
and its learnability in unsupervised tasks.  In particular, we expected that the 
kinds of categories that people naturally create in everyday life should also be 
highly learnable in laboratory free (unsupervised) classification tasks.  Thus, the 
first questions we addressed was(1) What is the basis for natural, intuitive, or 
meaningful categories in normal, everyday settings? and (2) Do people tend to 
create or discover the same kinds of categories in laboratory free categorization 
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tasks? 
 
Theories of Natural Categorization 
 What kinds of categories do people naturally create in the real world?  The 
most influential theory of category structure in recent decades has been Rosch's 
(1975) family resemblance theory, which proposes that everyday "natural kind" 
categories are based on overall similarity among members of those categories.  
In particular, members of the same category are predicted to have high overall 
within-group similarity with regard to shared features or attributes, even though 
there may be no individually necessary or defining features that must be shared 
by all members of a given category (Mervis & Rosch, 1981).  Within this 
framework, the most representative exemplar of a category is that which shares 
the most attributes with other members of the same category and the fewest with 
members of other categories.  The key difference between family resemblance 
and earlier, "classical" theories of category structure is that in family resemblance 
theory categories are defined in terms of overall similarity among members of 
that category, not a set of logically necessary and sufficient features (e.g., Smith 
& Medin, 1981; Murphy, 2002).   
 In addition to its obvious intuitive appeal, there is a great deal of empirical 
evidence in favor of this general idea that overall similarity or family resemblance 
is the basis for natural categories.  In one illustrative set of studies, Rosch, 
Simpson and Miller (1976) used various types of stimuli, such as dot patterns, 
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stick figures, and letter sequences, to demonstrate individuals' sensitivity to 
similarity. In this research, the typicality of an item within a given category (i.e. 
how closely it matched the category prototype) predicted several outcomes, 
including the ease with which items were learned, their speed of classification, 
ratings of similarity, and the order in which items were generated from memory. 
These results were unaffected by the frequency of different members within a 
particular category, demonstrating that typicality effects are based on category 
structure (similarity) and not simply a result of repeated exposure to certain 
members of a category. These findings are supported by several other 
experiments with similar results (Rosch, 1973; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; and 
Smiths, Rips, & Shoben, 1974).  
 Rosch's concept of basic level categories also supports the idea that 
similarity is a natural basis for categorization.   The basic level tends to that level 
at which the ratio of within- to between-category similarity is maximized, i.e., at 
which different members of the same category are highly similar but different 
categories at the same level are easily distinguished (highly dissimilar).  The 
basic level also tends to be the most abstract level at which an average or 
prototype makes sense and can serve as an informative basis for categorization.   
For example the category of "animal" is too abstract to serve as a basic level 
category because no informative prototype can be generated. On the other hand 
a category like "dog" can generate a much more useful prototype for 
categorization (Rosch, 1978).  
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 Consistent with this Roschian concept of family resemblance, several 
researchers have argued that the function of categories is feature inference, i.e., 
predicting unknown features of an object based on its category membership.   
The ability to do this depends on the existence of a large number of commonly 
shared features within a category (Corter & Gluck, 1992; Anderson, 1990, 1991).  
Proposed computational models, including Anderson's Rational Model and the 
Category Utility model of Corter and Gluck (1992), argue that categories are 
basically a way to capture feature correlations in the learning environment.    
From this perspective, the greater the similarity of members within a given 
category, the more useful that category will be for predicting unknown features of 
any given member.  
 
Similarity as a Basis for Free Categorization 
 A number of laboratory experiments have provided evidence that, at least 
in certain situations, people do indeed freely divide objects into categories on the 
basis of overall similarity or family resemblance.  For example, Pothos and 
Chater's (2002) "simplicity model" -- basically a mathematical formalization of 
Roschian family resemblance -- predicts that similarity-based categorization 
should be found in a free sorting task. In their studies, participants were shown 
multiple stimuli at the same time and were asked to freely sort them into 
categories. The stimulus objects used in these experiments were simple artificial 
stimuli composed of two metric (continuously-varying) dimensions, e.g., star-like 
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objects consisting of inner and outer stars each varying continuously in size 
across different objects.  The results of these experiments were generally in 
accord with  the predictions of similarity-based sorting, hence with Rosch's 
prediction that family resemblance should provide the natural basis for human 
categories.  A variety of free sorting experiments by Pothos and others (Pothos, 
Perlman, Bailey, Kurtz, Edwards, Hines, & McDonnell, 2011) have obtained 
similar results. 
 Further support for similarity-based categorization comes from several 
experiments employing a variation of free sorting referred to as the "triad task" 
(Smith & Kemler, 1984; Ward, 1983; and Ward, Foley, & Cole, 1986). In this task, 
participants view three stimuli and determine which two go together based either 
on a dimensional rule (sharing the same value on one dimension) or a similarity 
rule (having similar but not identical values on two dimensions).  Smith and 
Kemler (1984)  demonstrated that when viewing separable stimuli adult 
participants categorized based on overall similarity of objects under certain 
conditions, specifically when they were required to perform the categorization 
task quickly, when they were required to perform a concurrent task, and when 
they were instructed to make impressionistic (carefree) responses.  Therefore, 
they concluded that sorting based on overall similarity was the natural or default 
strategy in this task. 
 An important limitation of all the studies described so far is that the stimuli 
were very simple, generally consisting of two dimensions varying in a metric or 
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continuous manner. One could argue that such results are uninformative with 
regard to typical natural stimuli, which are commonly much more complex and 
may contain numerous dimensions that vary discretely as well as continuously.  
For this reason, it is important to show that similarity-based sorting also obtains 
for relatively complex, discretely-varying stimulus domains, as well as for the 
kinds of simple metric stimuli used in the experiments discussed so far. 
 
Lack of Sensitivity to Similarity 
 The results of several early free sorting experiments suggested that 
people may not categorize all types of stimuli based on overall similarity. For 
example, Handel and Imai (1972) found that when the dimensions of an object 
are easily distinguished (separable), participants tend to categorize the objects 
based on a single defining dimension. On the other hand, when objects' 
dimensions were not easily distinguished (integral), participants based their 
categories on overall similarity., e.g., their groupings were affected by both 
dimensions of the stimuli rather than only one.  These results along with those 
from other studies lead to a general consensus that single dimensions are often 
the main basis for categorization of highly separable stimuli and overall similarity 
is the main basis for categorizing integral stimuli (Garner, 1974; Smith & Kemler, 
1978). 
 One widely known set of studies showing that people often do not sort on 
the basis of overall similarity was carried out by Medin, Wattenmaker, and 
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Hampson (1987).  They operationally defined family resemblance (FR) 
categories in terms of Rosch's (1973) concept of a prototype, defined as the most 
central or representative member of a category.  In their experiments, they began 
with a prototypical stimulus and then created members of that prototype's 
category by varying a single feature while keeping all other features identical 
(see Table 1). These categories met Rosch's definition of family resemblance in 
the sense that specific members of a given category shared greater average 
within-group similarity and less between-group similarity, and there was no single 
defining feature that could be used to identify all members of a given category. 
Given this definition of FR categories, the question of interest is whether 
individuals will actually generate these kinds of categories or show sensitivity to 
such structures. 
 Somewhat surprisingly, Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson, (1987) had 
great difficulty finding situations in which participants demonstrated sensitivity to 
FR structures (i.e., overall similarity). In fact what they found when using stimulus 
sets based on these FR structures was that participants overwhelmingly chose to 
base category membership on a single dimension of the stimuli, while ignoring all 
other dimensions and hence overall similarity. Although individual differences 
exist in regards to which specific dimensions are preferred for classification, 
participants in these experiments overwhelmingly sorted based on a single 
dimension (referred to as 1D sorting) rather than overall similarity or family 
resemblance.  
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 One possible reason why people might have sorted on single dimensions 
in the Medin et al, (1987) studies is that each dimension of the stimuli in these 
experiments had only two possible values (Ahn & Medin, 1992). This argument is 
based on Ahn and Medin's (1992) two-stage model in which it is proposed that 
individuals first choose the most salient feature amongst a set of stimuli and after 
dividing the set based on this feature move on to more specific within-group 
classifications. If the dimensions of a set of objects only vary between two values 
as is the case in Medin et al. (1987) then once the most salient feature is chosen 
and the objects are sorted into their appropriate category it is difficult to further 
perform any meaningful within group categorization (for clarification see Table 1). 
Expanding on this idea, Ahn and Medin suggested that if the objects' dimensions 
varied with more than two possible values, then more complex sorting can occur. 
In fact researchers demonstrated that under these conditions FR based sorting 
could be obtained (Ahn & Medin, 1992). However, FR sorting was only observed 
when participants were limited to generating two categories. When true free 
sorting was allowed, participants reverted to their preferred strategy of relying on 
a single dimension to assign category membership.  
 More generally, one could argue that the practice of using stimulus sets in 
which the objects vary through only two values on each dimension results in a 
rather unnatural type of category structure.  Greater dimensional variation may 
be important for creating more natural structures, because it more closely mimics 
the kind of variation that exists in nature than the highly constrained variation 
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found in artificial stimulus sets such as those used by Medin et al (1987) and 
others.  For example, a spider has some common features shared with most 
other spiders, e.g., their legs. If one were to assign a value to each variation of 
spider legs observed across many different types of spiders, one would likely find 
that although the feature itself (that is, having legs) is shared among all spiders 
the actual value (version) of that feature varies greatly across different spiders.  
Certainly one would not expect to see two and only two versions of spider legs, 
each repeated exactly across all individuals and species in which it occurs.  In 
fact, it is often the case that nature fails to replicate the exact same design for a 
given structure even among very similar creatures. Birds have many variations of 
wings, beaks, and, tails even among closely related species; the same is true for 
eyes, scales, and fins of fish and so on, with numerous other examples existing 
in nature.   This could be an important limitation of FR structures such as those 
used by Medin et al. (1987), a point to which we will return later in this 
Introduction. 
 Another result found by Medin et al. was that when participants were 
provided conceptual knowledge allowing them to recognize casual relationships 
between the members of a given category (for example, when categories of  
fictitious people were related to stereotypes such as "introverted" vs. 
"extroverted"), FR based sorting was often observed.  Although there is a good 
deal of research on the influence of prior knowledge on categorization (Hayes & 
Taplin, 1992; Heit, 1994; and Linvingston & Andrews, 1995), a more central 
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focus of this paper was the processing of novel stimuli for which an individual 
would have practically no specific prior knowledge to use as a basis for 
categorization. Providing conceptual knowledge may certainly facilitate the 
learning and assimilation of new categories, but at some level category learning 
must be based on a basic, fundamental ability to recognize novel patterns even 
in the absence of relevant conceptual knowledge. 
 Following up on Medin et al. (1987),  Regehr and Brooks (1995) carried 
out an important series of studies in which they explored a variety of stimulus 
constructions and presentation conditions in an effort to determine specific 
conditions under which family resemblance categorization could be observed. In 
their first set of experiments, they demonstrated that participants overwhelmingly 
tended to sort complex, multi-dimensional stimuli based a single dimension even 
when the stimuli contained numerous distinguishable features, when stimuli we 
constructed to be perceived as holistic "blobs" and when participants were 
provided descriptors meant to facilitate alternative categorization strategies.  
These studies convincingly refute any objection that the lack of FR sorting in 
earlier studies was due an insufficient difference in within- versus between-
category similarity.  Overall, promoting FR sorting through the manipulation of 
stimulus structure was much more difficult than originally anticipated (Regehr & 
Brooks, 1995).  
 In a second set of experiments, Regehr and Brooks (1995) used a match-
to-samples procedure in which participants were shown two stimuli, each serving 
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as the prototype of its own category, followed a series of single stimuli, each to 
be placed in one of these two categories. Under these more constrained sorting 
conditions FR sorting was often observed.  This tendency to engage in FR 
sorting in different variants of the match-to-samples task was replicated by 
Regehr and Brooks (1995) across several experiments. Milton and Wills (2004) 
attempted to replicate Regher and Brook's (1995) results using stimuli with 
greater spatial integration, whose features form a more cohesive stimulus and 
are arguably more natural than previous stimuli. People showed a mixture of FR 
and one-dimensional sorting in these experiments, and in some cases the use of 
more realistic stimuli actually reduced the tendency to engage in FR sorting .   
Based on their findings, Milton and Wills (2004) argued that FR sorting  may 
require an effortful analytic process of integrating across separate dimensions, 
and hence may not be the basis for natural or spontaneous categorization.  
 Further support for the idea that FR sorting in the match-to-samples task 
is actually more effortful than 1D sorting was provided by a series of experiments 
carried out by Wills, Milton, Longmore, and Hester  (2013). By having participants 
categorize stimuli while concurrently rehearsing a set of numbers for a secondary 
task, Wills et al. found that the occurrence of similarity-based categorization 
decreased under conditions of high cognitive load. This pattern of  results 
remained even when participants' performance on the secondary task  was 
deemphasized.  In a following experiment, Wills et al. (2013) found that those 
participants with higher scores on working memory measures were more likely to 
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adopt a similarity-based sorting strategy from the onset of the task, while those 
with lower working memory scores were more likely to demonstrate 1D sorting.  
In a final experiment, participants in one condition were instructed to think 
carefully about their sorting decisions, while those in the other condition were 
given no special instructions.  The results indicated that overall similarity sorting 
was significantly more likely in the careful-instruction condition than in the 
neutral-instruction condition. Together, these findings suggest that sorting based 
on overall similarity is a more effortful and demanding process than sorting on 
the basis of a single dimension.  
 In addition to the fact the FR sorting appears more effortful and less 
natural than 1D sorting in the match-to-samples task, it should also be pointed 
out that the match-to-samples task is not an example of truly free classification, 
and thus has only limited relevance to the kind of naturalistic, unsupervised 
categorization of interest here.   In particular, the match-to-samples procedure 
provides participants with specific standards (category prototypes) on which to 
base their sorting.  Thus, the categories in this task are actually created by the 
experimenter rather than by the participant, much as in studies of supervised 
learning.   This means that any preference for FR sorting that people might show 
in the match-to-samples task cannot be taken as strong evidence for similarity-
based categorization in more naturalistic contexts. 
 
Limitations of Previous Research 
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 The research discussed so far has revealed a significant gap in our 
current understanding of natural categorization.  The most fundamental issue has 
been the difficulty of finding similarity- or family resemblance-based free 
categorization in laboratory tasks, in contrast to their apparent importance in the 
real world, as documented by Rosch and others (Wittgenstein, 1957; Posner & 
Keele, 1968; and Smith, Shoben, & Rips ,1974).  The evidence discussed so far 
would seem to suggest that similarity-based categorization is relatively rare, and 
when it does occur  is a cognitively demanding process that requires conscious 
effort.  Although achievable by humans under certain (surprisingly limited) 
conditions, similarity-based categorization appears to be far from the kind of 
automatic or natural process imagined by early theorists (Mervis & Rosch, 1981).  
In fact, one could argue that there have been no convincing demonstrations to 
date of similarity-based categorization of complex, discretely varying objects in a 
task that involves truly free or unconstrained sorting.   
 The argument could be made that perhaps similarity simply is not the 
basis for natural categories.  However, the Roschian analysis of common 
categories such as animals species, classifications of cars and people etc., 
continues to suggest that within-group similarity is a trait shared by many natural 
categories.   Moreover, functional arguments (e.g., Anderson, 1990, 1991; Corter 
& Gluck, 1992) that similarity-based categories maximize inductive inference (the 
ability to predict features of instances given their category membership) remain 
convincing.   
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 An alternative possibility is that the problem lies not with the theory of 
similarity-based categorization itself, but rather with the specific empirical 
methods (experimental procedures, stimulus set structures, etc.) used to 
investigate it.  In this thesis, I argue that there are several problems with the 
procedures and stimuli used in previous research that limit our ability to draw 
valid conclusions about natural categorization on the basis of that research.   In 
particular, I argue that when appropriate stimuli and procedures are employed, 
similarity-based categorization can be demonstrated on a reliable basis. 
 One such issue stems from the particular way in which similarity has been 
defined in previous experiments.  The stimuli in some of these experiments 
consist of  a very limited number of variable dimensions, sometimes as few as 
one or two (Handel & Imai, 1972; Smith & Kemler, 1978).   Even when a larger 
numbers of dimensions is used, the number of values along which a dimensions 
can vary is typically very limited, often to only two values (as in Medin, 
Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987).   Perhaps for this reason, the FR structures 
used in these studies  are very difficult to distinguish, even when one has  just 
seen them organized into two separate categories.  For example, consider Figure 
1, which illustrates a stimulus set designed in accord with the kind of FR structure 
used in Medin  et al. (1987). One can see that the objects vary along the same 
dimensions, with only two possible values for each dimension, making 1D sorting 
an easily available option.  But the FR categories themselves are almost 
impossible to "see" when instances are mixed together randomly in the same 
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display. (To see this, the reader is invited to cover panel A and then try sort the 
objects in panel B into the two FR categories shown in panel A. It is surprisingly 
difficult!). 
 Another limitation of previous research comes from the types of tasks 
used to study categorization. The typical sorting task requires that participants 
place stimuli into separate categories, often with only two categories to choose 
from (Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987; and Anh & Medin, 1992).  It is 
possible that the commonly observed preference for 1D sorting is due to the 
forced choice nature of this type of task. Participants must place stimuli into 
separate categories and therefore if they are unable to detect the underling 
structure, as seems to be the case with FR structures, they must resort to some 
other strategy for dividing them into separate groups.  In such cases, 1D sorting 
may be an easily-available alternative even if such categories would not 
ordinarily be preferred.  
The triad and match-to-samples procedures discussed earlier (Smith & 
Kemler, 1978; and Regehr & Brooks, 1995) are also problematic, at least if the 
aim is to study truly free categorization.  One problem is that the apparent 
sensitivity to overall similarity observed in these tasks may be due to the highly 
constrained nature of the comparisons they allow.  For example, the match-to-
samples task provides participants with category prototypes, after which they are 
presented with a series of stimuli and asked to sort each into one of the two 
prototype categories. These task conditions promote individual comparisons 
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between each object and the prototype.  However these conditions are rather 
unnatural in that participants are forced to place stimuli into one of the two 
categories even if under more natural circumstances they may not feel 
comfortable matching a specific object with one of the provided prototypes.  
Under these constraints participants may engage in more effortful feature 
matching than would occur in a more natural categorization scenario.  Moreover, 
in this task the experimenter creates the categories (by setting up the 
prototypes), not the participant;  this could result in quite a different division of the 
set than if the person were allowed to create their own categories at will. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RECENT CATEGORIZATION RESEARCH 
 
Recent Work in our Laboratory 
 Recent research by Clapper (2015) has attempted to address some of 
these issues to discover forms of similarity that people will recognize and use as 
a basis for categories in unsupervised tasks.  As already discussed, the kinds of 
FR category structures used in previous experiments (such as that illustrated in 
Figure 1) were often difficult to distinguish, possibly due to the limited variability 
of the stimuli and excessive overlapping features shared between different 
categories.  One could argue that perhaps a stronger manipulation of within- 
versus between-group similarity might lead to consistent sensitivity to similarity.  
However, Regher and Brooks (1995) investigated this possibility thoroughly.  For 
example, they conducted a study using stimuli with over ten dimensions and 
found that even with the greater difference in within- versus between-category 
similarity this allowed, participants still found it difficult to sort based on overall 
similarity. Given this difficultly in detecting categories in FR and other similarity 
based structures, one question of interest is whether similarity is ineffective in 
general, or if people might show greater sensitivity to categories based on some 
alternative definition of similarity.   
 
Similarity as Alignability 
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 To address this question we suggest a model of similarity in which objects 
are primarily distinguishable based on their overall alignability or structural 
correspondence (e.g., Gentner, 1983).  Figure 2 provides an example of the 
kinds of "alignability-based" categories we discuss. Note that the three categories 
of objects in this Figure are easily distinguishable from each other, even though 
most members of each category share no specific feature values in common with 
other members of the same category.  What they do share is the same overall 
structure, i.e., corresponding parts in the same general arrangement.   Within 
each of these alignable categories, objects vary along four discrete features, 
each of which can take on many possible values.  As discussed later, this 
variability allows us greater freedom in the manipulation of feature-based 
similarity within each of the three broad alignability-based categories compared 
to the usual binary features, and arguably more closely resembles the kind of 
variation found in natural categories.   A series of studies by Clapper (2015) 
demonstrated that participants are sensitive to such alignable categories, with 
the probability of placing alignable objects into the same category being much 
higher than that of placing non-alignable objects into the same category. 
 
The Binomial Labeling Task 
 Besides the newly developed stimulus structure, these studies also 
adopted a different kind of categorization task than previous research in this 
area. The goal of this new task was to provide participants with the freedom to 
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generate as many or as few categories as they saw fit.  Above, we argued that 
one cause for the prevalence of 1D sorting in prior sorting tasks may have been 
the forced-choice nature of these tasks. When participants are instructed to 
categorize objects and presented with category structures they cannot easily 
detect, they may feel forced to adopt some sort of strategy for categorization, 
with 1D sorting being an easy and therefore common alternative. In contrast, the 
Binomial Labeling (BL) task puts no constraints on participants in regards to the 
number of allowed categories, the criteria for categorization, or the number of 
stimuli that should be in the same category.  This task requires participants to 
generate two-part (binomial) labels for each item in a stimulus array, with a letter 
(A,B,C etc.) designating a superordinate or "family" level of categorization for that 
item and a number (1,2,3 etc.) designating a subordinate or "species" level of 
categorization. (People were told to imagine that the objects in the arrays were 
novel organisms and that they were biologists attempting to sort these organisms 
into meaningful categories). An illustration of a test page from this task, using the 
same stimuli as in Figure 2, is show in figure 3a. 
 
Demonstrating Sensitivity to Similarity 
 As already noted, previous work with the BL task has provided evidence 
for people's sensitivity to alignability-based categories. In particular, people 
showed a strong tendency to assign the same family label to objects that shared 
a similar structure or arrangement of features, even when no single feature was 
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identical across any of these objects.  People also demonstrated sensitivity to 
specific matching feature values. Note that two instances within each alignable 
family in Figure 3A are identical, i.e. they share all four of their features. People 
tended to assign such matching instances the same species labels, as shown in 
Figure 3B. On the other hand, people in the labeling task show little sensitivity to 
category structures based on the statistical distribution of feature values within 
the same alignability-based category.  For example, Clapper (2015) employed 
some stimulus sets in which alignable categories could be broken down into 
subcategories based on the same kind of FR structure used in Medin et al (1987) 
and other sorting studies.  The expectation was that if people recognized this FR 
structure, they should divide the objects into categories (at either family or 
species level) in accordance with this structure.   However, no evidence of 
sensitivity to FR structures was observed.  As mentioned previously, this lack of 
sensitivity may be due to the limited variability and feature overlap between 
categories found in stimulus sets of this type.   
 FR categories are defined in terms of feature-based similarity, i.e., the 
proportion of matching versus mismatching features shared among a group of 
objects, as opposed to overall alignability.  Despite their insensitivity to FR 
structure, there do appear to be certain conditions under which people will create 
sub-categories (within a broader alignability-based category) based on individual 
matching features of the objects concerned.  In fact, under these conditions 
people appear to show a graded sensitivity to similarity based on the number or 
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proportion of matching features shared by the objects concerned (Clapper, Miller, 
and Smith, 2015).  This means that people are sensitive to similarity defined in 
terms of matching versus mismatching features, as well as overall alignability, in 
their patterns of free categorization. 
 The FR categories illustrated in Figure 1 seem especially difficult to 
distinguish due to the limited range of variability on each dimension (only two 
values) as well as the degree of feature overlap that exists between the two 
categories.  However, by using a different type of stimulus set design, we were 
able to demonstrate that people are sensitive to feature-based similarity under 
certain circumstances (Clapper, Miller, and Smith, 2015).  An illustration of this 
kind of stimulus set design is shown in Figure 4. In two experiments, we 
systematically manipulated the number of matching features between pairs of 
alignable objects from one out of four to two, three, or four out of four matching 
features.  Importantly, the matching objects did not share any feature values with 
any other members of the same alignability-based categories; in principle, this 
should have made it easy to distinguish these two objects from the rest as a 
separate subcategory, provided they shared enough informative features to 
justify creating such a subcategory.  Moreover, because the objects within each 
alignability-based category varied through a large number of values per 
dimension, participants should have regarded it as statistically unlikely (hence 
informative) for any two objects to share the same value on any given dimension, 
and even more so for them to share the same values on multiple dimensions.  
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Thus, we might expect such matches to be weighed more heavily as a basis for 
categories in a stimulus set of this type than in the type of FR set illustrated in 
Figure1. 
 The results of these experiments showed that the number of matching 
features influenced categorization in a graded manner. (Note that these two 
experiments were identical in logic and design except that number of matching 
features was manipulated between participants in one experiment and within 
participants in the other; their results were also virtually identical). While people 
generally grouped objects into families based on overall alignability, as explained 
above, the probability of placing two objects into the same exact category (i.e., 
assigning them the same family and species label) increased with the number of 
matching features they shared (see Figure 5, panel A), with the probability of 
placing the objects together being greatest in the four-out-of-four matching 
features condition. It is important to note that the probability function was non-
linear, with the likelihood of grouping two objects together accelerating or 
growing exponentially with each additional matching feature.   
 One question raised by these results is whether similarity, defined in terms 
of the proportion of matching features shared by two alignable objects, would 
have the same effect on direct similarity ratings as on categorization (labeling) 
probabilities.  To answer this question, we asked participants to view the same 
arrays of objects used in the two studies just described, with the objects 
numbered in order from 1 to 16.  At the bottom of the page, participants were 
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given specific pairs of objects (referred to by number)  and were asked to provide 
numerical similarity ratings for each on a 20-point scale. Interestingly, this data 
showed a much more linear function in regards to the number of matching 
features than that found in the labeling task (see Figure 5, panel B).  For each 
additional matching feature participants' average similarity ratings increased by a 
near-equal amount (i.e., the linear trend was significant but the quadratic trend 
was not).  The results from these experiments indicate that sensitivity to similarity 
is significantly different when assessed by a free labeling task as opposed to a 
direct similarity rating task.  Naturally, this  raised the question of why these 
differences in the shape of the similarity "sensitivity function" are found in these 
different tasks. 
 
A Two-Stage Model of Free Categorization 
 Examination of the similarity function from the rating task  suggests that 
people assign near equal weight to each  feature of an object, resulting in the 
approximately linear function seen in Figure 5B. By contrast, people in the BL 
task seem to assign increasing value to each additional matching feature, 
resulting in the accelerating or exponential function seen in Figure 5A.  One 
possible explanation for this difference begins by noting that the similarity task 
provides participants with specific pairs of stimuli to compare, rather than 
requiring them to search the array and decide which objects to compare on their 
own.  This means that people are forced to compare the matching pairs, 
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obviously increasing the likelihood that participants will notice their matching 
features. In contrast, when performing the BL task participants must view all 16 
objects in an array and decide for themselves which pairs to compare, with no 
external guidance.  Such a selection process is necessary because too many 
pair combinations (120 in a 16-object array) exist to feasibly compare each one 
in a short period of time.  Of course, this problem also exits in natural settings, 
whenever one is attempting to classify some object of interest:  Out of an infinite 
number of possible comparisons that a person  could  make, they somehow  
have to determine which ones are actually relevant and useful for learning valid 
categories.  
  Based on these considerations, we have proposed a two-stage model to 
account for people's pattern of categorization behavior in the BL task.  
Specifically, we argue that assigning two objects the same unique species label 
in this task necessarily involves two steps or stages, consisting of (1) a sampling 
or selection stage in which particular pairs of objects are chosen for comparison, 
and (2) an evaluation or decision stage in which the person decides whether to 
place the objects into the same or different categories.  The proportion of 
matching features shared by a pair of objects could, in principle, affect both 
stages.  In the sampling stage, matching features could facilitate a spontaneous 
or automatic selection of pairs with greater feature overlap. In other words, the 
probability of two objects being compared (versus not compared) could increase 
with the number of features they share, due to automatic principles of attentional 
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salience or memory retrieval.   During the decision stage, a larger number of 
matching features might increase the likelihood that a person will place the two 
objects into the same category.  
 This model can explain the different similarity functions from the rating 
versus labeling tasks by assuming that the rating task involves only the 
evaluation-decision stage, because people are told which pairs to compare in 
that task, while the labeling task necessarily involves both sampling and 
evaluation, because people must first compare the matching pair before they can 
notice that they have overlapping features and assign them the same label.  If 
more matching features increases the likelihood of both comparison and of a 
positive evaluation, that could explain the non-linear effects of such features 
shown in Figure 5A. 
 
Distinguishing Sampling from Labeling 
 The goal of the current study was to test the suggested two-stage model 
by assessing the independent influence of each stage on free categorization. The 
previously mentioned BL task provided us with data in the form of labels, allowing 
us to observe the outcome of the categorization processes, i.e., the aggregated 
impact of both sampling and decision stages. However, this task provides no 
direct way to assess sampling independent of the subsequent decision process.  
The goal of the present experiment was to disentangle these two stages by 
including an independent measure of people's online patterns of attentional 
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selection and comparison, i.e., sampling.    Using a modified version of the BL 
task we have added a measure indicating whether or not a particular pair has 
been sampled, i.e., selected for comparison, independently of whether they both 
receive the same species label during the subsequent decision stage. This 
independent measure of sampling should allow us to determine to what degree 
categorization is influenced by the events at the sampling versus decision 
stages. 
 The modified BL task also presents objects sequentially (one at a time) 
rather than showing the entire display at once. This modification limits 
participants' focus to one object at a time and requires that they remember 
specific objects in order to perform comparisons and form categories. This 
modification was necessary for the experimental manipulations we undertook in 
the present study, as described below.  It also addressed to some degree an 
issue noted earlier, namely, that we rarely view an entire array of stimuli for our 
comparison and categorization and more commonly have to recall examples of a 
category from memory (Regher and Brooks,1995).  
 In a pilot version of the current study, we utilized a sequential presentation 
of nine stimuli in a 3x3 visual array, presented by computer rather than in paper-
and-pencil booklets as in earlier BL studies. Participants were asked to label 
each object as described earlier by typing in their label under that object, and 
also had to provide a brief verbal rationale for each label they generated.  This 
verbal response was recorded immediately after the person typed in a given 
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label.  Each display contained a single matching pair of objects and that pair 
shared all (four out of four) of their variable features in common. The results 
confirmed the basic pattern observed in our previous studies, i.e., participants' 
labels indicated a sensitivity to alignability-based categories as well as to specific 
matching instances.  Specifically, they tended to group objects into families on 
the basis of overall alignability, while matching features often provided the basis 
for labeling at the species level. Thus, the labeling data from this new sequential 
task replicated the patterns found earlier with the whole-array paper-and-pencil 
BL task.  
 The verbal responses also indicated that participants were sensitive to 
matching instances.   In particular, when they were about to label the second 
matching object in an array, people were likely to make specific mention of the 
first (i.e., to say that the current object was identical or virtually identical to a 
specific previous object).  This verbal mention of the previous matching object 
was highly predictive of giving the two objects the same label; when the objects 
were given the same label the previous object was mentioned virtually 100 
percent of the time, whereas the previous object was much less likely to be 
mentioned when different labels were used.  
 Given these initial results, one obvious next step would be to manipulate 
similarity (number of matching features shared by a given pair of objects) in this 
modified BL task.  This would allow us to test the two-stage model by 
determining whether verbal mention of the previous object (indicating selection or 
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sampling of the relevant pair) is affected in the same way by similarity as the final 
assignment of the same label to both objects.  Thus, if frequency of mention and 
assignment of the same label both increase in parallel with each additional 
matching feature, that would suggest that stage 1 (sampling) is accounting for all 
of the variance in labeling behavior.  On the other hand, if the probability of 
receiving the same label increases more quickly with matching features than 
does frequency of mention, this would suggest an independent contribution of the 
decision stage (i.e., that both stages affect the final labeling outcome).   This 
might occur if people were likely to compare matching objects regardless of how 
many features they shared (whether one or four), but were only likely to give 
them the same species labels if they shared a large proportion of their features. 
 The sequential task also allowed for the manipulation of a second 
independent variable highly relevant to the two-stage model, namely, the 
distance or temporal delay between two matching objects.  By manipulating 
temporal delay, we should be able to directly manipulate the availability of the 
first instance in a matching pair from memory, and thus the probability of the 
person sampling that specific pair for comparison (stage 1).   Having established 
this basic temporal distance effect, we could then compare the effects of 
temporal delay to that of matching features to determine whether they have the 
same impact on categorization. This will allow us to evaluate the two-stage 
model by seeing whether distance has the same effect on sampling as opposed 
to final labeling.  Comparing similarity and distance effects should also help us 
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assess the degree to which the similarity effect is a function of sampling 
probability alone (likelihood of noticing/remembering the first object while labeling 
the second), as opposed to a mixed model involving both sampling and decision 
processes.   
 
The Current Study 
 In this thesis, we manipulated distance alone as an independent variable.  
(Assuming meaningful results, we will manipulate distance and similarity 
orthogonally in a subsequent experiment; see the General Discussion).  As in the 
pilot study discussed above, the target pairs in this experiment matched on all 
variable features (four out of four), meaning that the two matching objects were 
identical in appearance.  We then varied whether the two matching objects are 
separated by zero, one, or two other objects in the array (i.e., distance equals 1, 
2, or 3; note that these other objects were always from a different alignment-
based category than the target objects).  We predicted that as the distance 
between two matching objects increases, the likelihood that participants' will 
explicitly acknowledge (report) their similarity would decrease, i.e., the person 
would be less likely to refer back the first object while labeling the second.  At the 
same time, given the proposed relationship between stages 1 and 2, we 
predicted that the likelihood of assigning the objects the same species label 
would also decrease.  Our second main prediction is that at all levels of distance, 
the probability of mentioning the first matching instance while labeling the second 
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would exceed the probability of assigning the two instances the same species 
label. In other words, people should mention the similarity between matching 
objects (i.e., sample or select that pair of objects for comparison) more frequently 
than they should give them the same label. This follows from the assumption that 
giving a pair of objects the same name depends on explicitly noticing that they 
are similar in some way, i.e., that labeling depends on prior sampling. 
 The main open research question addressed by this study is whether the 
likelihood of noticing similarity between matching pairs will decrease at the same 
rate in relation to distance as the likelihood of giving the pair the same label.  In 
other words, does the decrease in the availability from memory of the first 
matching object while labeling the second object -- a stage 1 effect -- account for 
all of the decrease in the probability of assigning the two objects the same label?   
If there had been no difference between reporting and labeling, this would 
suggested that the likelihood of labeling is directly predicted by sampling; in other 
words, only differences at stage 1 affect the final outcome. However, it was also 
possible that stage 2 might make an independent contribution to the expected 
distance effect.  In this case, we anticipated that sampling (explicit reporting of 
the pairs' similarity) would be less affected by distance than labeling.  This would 
suggest that even when participants can recall more distant earlier objects, they 
are less likely to assign them to the same category as the current object due to 
their greater separation in time.  This could occur, for example, if people were 
able to recall fewer details about the first object at greater distances, and so felt 
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less confident about putting it into the same category as the second object when 
their temporal separation was greater.   
 In order to measure stage 1 (sampling/selection), the pilot study described 
above utilized a verbal protocol in which participants responded to probes of the 
form "Why did you give this object the same/different label as some previous 
object?" while being audio recorded.  Given the relative consistency in types of 
responses that people provided in that study, and in an effort simplify data 
collection and analysis, we have adopted a new menu-based response 
procedure in the present study.   Rather than responding to a verbal probe and 
having their open-ended responses audio recorded, participants compared the 
current object to previous objects by selecting the best-fitting response from a list 
of provided options.  After typing in their label for a given object and before 
moving on to the next object, participants selected which of five statements 
comparing the current object to previous objects was most accurate using a 
dropdown menu (see Appendix D for the list of options). Three of the options 
indicated some level of similarity to a specific earlier object, one indicated 
general similarity to more than one previous object, and the final option indicated 
no similarity to previous objects. The three options referring to a specific previous 
object also varied in their perceived level of similarity or confidence in their level 
of match, allowing us to assess the effects of distance on not only on recalling a 
previous object, but also on the detail or confidence of that recall.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
The participants were 46 undergraduate students from California State 
University, San Bernardino who participated in return for extra credit in one of 
their Psychology classes. 
 
Procedures 
 Participants were tested in groups in a small computer laboratory with a 
maximum of 12 participants tested at a time. Each participant sat down at a 
computer workstation and was given an informed consent form. After signing the 
form participants were verbally given brief instructions on how to interact with the 
computer program. Participants were told to read the instructions carefully, make 
sure they understood the instructions before proceeding, and to feel free to ask 
any questions if they were unclear about the task. The task instructions asked 
participants to imagine that they were inter-planetary biologists who had just 
received a shipment of fossilized Martian organisms, and their job was to classify 
these organisms at both “family” and “species” levels (see Appendix A). To do 
this, participants were instructed to create a two-part label, consisting of a letter 
designating a family (superordinate) level category plus a number designating a 
specific species (subordinate level category) within that family.  Following the 
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instruction screen, the program displayed two sample displays. One contained 16 
creatures in a 4 x 4 display with labels under each creature and was intended to 
provide an example of the labeling procedure (see Appendix B). The other 
display also contained 16 creatures in a 4 x4 display, but only one creature was 
visible while the rest appeared blurred (see Appendix C). This display was 
intended to provide an example of how the task would actually appear as the 
participant progressed from labeling one creature to the next. Following the two 
sample displays, a final instruction screen informed the participant that after they 
entered their label for a given creature, a drop-down menu would automatically 
appear on the screen (see Appendix D).  This menu offered several statements 
about the current object in comparison to prior objects, such as " identical/nearly 
identical to a specific previous object", "different overall from previous objects", 
and so on (see Appendix D for the complete list of responses).  The participant 
was instructed to select the one menu option that most accurately described the 
relationship between the current and prior objects.   
 Once the task began, objects were displayed sequentially, starting in the 
top left hand corner and moving from left to right, proceeding row by row from the 
top to the bottom of the display (see Appendix E).  After the participant entered a 
label for a specific object, a menu would automatically appear so that they could 
compare that object to prior objects, as explained above.  This procedure was 
followed for all 16 objects in the display. Following completion of the first display, 
the same procedures were used for the second and third displays.  Once the task 
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was finished, a short debriefing message was displayed asking participants not 
to share the details of the study with other students and providing researcher 
contact information in case they had further questions regarding the study. 
 
Materials and Design 
 All of the stimuli were constructed using Microsoft Word's graphics tools, 
specifically by using and combining various shapes available through the "Insert -
- Shapes" menu. Each object was assembled from 4 primary shapes which were 
moved, rotated, and combined to form the various features of the stimuli. For a 
given category, each of these four features could vary along up to  six possible 
values. For example, if a given category of objects had wing-like parts coming 
out of their sides, there were up to six possible types of wing-like parts that could 
be presented across different examples.  (Note that there was a maximum of six 
instances in each category in this experiment, and naturally this number 
determines the maximum number of possible values for any given dimension of 
those stimuli).  Members of a given category shared the same overall structure 
(they were alignable, meaning that they had corresponding parts in the same 
spatial relationships) but varied in regards to the specific features of which they 
were composed (as in Figures 2 - 4).  The specific features or parts of which 
objects were composed, and most importantly the overall arrangement of those 
parts, varied between different non-alignable categories.  Three distinct non-
alignable categories were utilized in each display presented in the current study. 
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 In this study each participant viewed three different 4 x 4 arrays of objects. 
Each display contained three alignability-based categories (which we will 
metaphorically refer to as the "tadpole", "hornhead", and "box-creature" 
categories).  Two of these had five examples each in the display, and the third 
had six examples, for a total of 16.  Within each of these categories, one pair of 
objects was identical (i.e., had the same values on all four potentially variable 
features), so that in total each display contained 3 pairs of identical instances. 
The distance between identical instances was manipulated within each display, 
with one pair having no separation between appearances (i.e., one was 
presented immediately after the other), another pair having one object appear 
between them, and the final pair having two objects appear between (see Figure 
6).  The distance or degree of separation between matching instances was the 
main independent variable of interest in this study.   
 For each participant, the assignment of category (i.e. hornhead, tadpole, 
or box-creature) to distance was counterbalanced so that each category had 
appeared at each distance by the time all three displays were viewed. The order 
in which each distance condition was presented was also balanced so that the 
distance between the first, second, and third matching pair was varied through all 
levels (1, 2, 3) in each display, with the orderings different across different 
displays.  In other words, in one display the first matching pair might have a 
distance of one, the second a distance of three, and the third a distance of two.  
In the next display the ordering would be different, e.g., distances of  two, three, 
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and one, in that order.  In addition, one member of a pair of identical instances 
never appeared between the presentation of another pair of identical instances.  
If there was space between the presentation of  two matching objects, only "filler" 
stimuli from different alignment-based categories appeared in between these two 
objects. Overall, the present design ensured that each participant would view 
every variation of distance and the ordering across the different displays, and 
that any materials effects would be balanced across different displays (i.e., the 
assignment of particular categories to roles in the experimental design was 
balanced across participants).  This was accomplished by creating three  
alternative sets of displays that differed in the assignment of specific categories 
to the previously explained design. Since a primary focus of this study is to 
analyze how participants label and justify their labeling of identical instances, the 
displays were designed so that participants would already be familiar with each 
alignable category prior to encountering either of the matching instances from 
that category.  Specifically no matching instances were shown in the first row of 
objects, and at least one object from each of the three alignable categories was 
shown in the first row. The complete scheme for counterbalancing distance 
conditions, order of presentation, etc, is shown in Table 2. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
RESULTS 
 
Research Questions 
The data from this experiment consists of the compound labels (A1, B1, 
etc) generated by participants, as well as their selection of a menu response 
describing each instance. This data was used to examine two main research 
questions: First, does the likelihood of giving two identical objects the same label 
decrease as the temporal distance between those objects increases? Second, 
does the likelihood of comparing two identical objects, as indicated by 
participants' selections from the response menu, decrease as the distance 
between the objects increases? The labels and response selections of greatest 
interest for examining these questions were from the second identical instance in 
each matching pair.  
 
Labeling Data 
 Participant's labeling data from each array was converted into a 16x16 
matrix representing whether each possible pair of objects from that array was 
assigned the same or different category labels. To assess people's sensitivity to 
overall alignability, we compared the proportion of alignable versus non-alignable 
objects in a given array that received the same family label. Participants placed 
alignable objects into the same family category approximately 71% of the time, 
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while non-alignable objects were given the same family label 11% of the time. 
This difference was significant according to a one sample t-test, t(45) = 15.76, p 
< .001. The same difference was also significant at the species level, M = .36 
and M = .10 for repeated versus non-repeated respectively, t(45) = 4.21, p < 
.001.  
 Of major interest in the current experiment is people's overall sensitivity to 
identical versus non-identical but alignable objects, as well as how that sensitivity 
is affected by distance in the array. This effect was assessed at the species level 
only. Participants gave identical objects the same species labels approximately 
36% of the time and gave non-identical objects the same labels approximately 
10% of the time. Overall, participants demonstrated a statistically significant 
sensitivity to repeated vs. non-repeated instances within the alignable categories, 
t(45) = 5.87, p < .001.  
 
Menu Data 
 The data from the menu responses was a categorical variable with five 
levels, one for each possible response. The frequency of each of these five 
responses is plotted as a function of order of presentation (averaged over 
categories) in Figure 8 (Note that Figure 8 excludes data from category A, 
because A was always the first category shown in the display; it also excludes 
the pair of identical objects within each category.) 
The overall pattern of data from the menu task suggests that people 
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generally selected appropriate responses to the presented stimuli. For example, 
line 5 in figure 8 represents the menu response "Different overall from previous 
objects". The majority of participants chose this response when viewing the first 
object from a new category (B1 or C1) but rarely chose it for later objects. On the 
other hand, response 1, "Identical/nearly identical to a specific previous object" 
was almost never chosen when viewing the first object in a new alignable 
category and only rarely thereafter. (Remember, this data is from non-matching 
objects only). In both cases, the observed pattern of responding seems to 
approximate the normatively correct or appropriate one. Reponses 2 and 3 
indicate that the current object looks somewhat similar to a specific previous 
object, and these were chosen more frequently in response to the second, third, 
and fourth objects from an alignable category, than the first object. A similar 
pattern is shown to response 4, which indicates similarity to several previous 
objects. A chi-square test shows that the overall pattern of responding differed as 
a function of order within each category (518.72, df = 12, p < .001).  Chi-square 
tests comparing specific examples within a category (first, second, third, fourth) 
showed a significantly difference in the overall pattern of responding between the 
first and second instance of each category (250.94, df = 4, p < .001), and 
between the second and third (33.82, df = 4, p < .001), but not between the third 
and fourth (2.25, df = 4, p = .689). Overall, the pattern of responses suggests that 
participants were using the menu in an appropriate manner and that their 
response strategies had stabilized by about the third example of each category.  
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 When examining the menu responses for matching pairs we looked 
specifically at the second repeated instances in each pair. For these objects, the 
first menu option was selected 56% of time, the second 16% of the time, the third 
7% of the time, the fourth 16% of the time, and the fifth 0.5% of the time. Since 
menu options 1,2, and 3 indicate specific similarity to previous objects in the 
display, these responses were of greatest interest in assessing stage 2 sampling 
effects. In principle, any (or all) of these three responses could indicate that the 
person had compared the second matching instance to the first. In order to 
determine which of these responses were actually valid indicators of stage 1 
sampling, we compared the probability of selecting each response when viewing 
a second repeated object compared to that when viewing a non-repeated 
instance. Only if the response is selected  more often for matching than non-
matching objects can it be considered a valid indicator of sampling matching 
objects.  
 Overall, menu response 1 was significantly more likely to be selected 
when viewing repeated instances (M = .56) than non-repeated instances (t(45) = 
12.55, p < .001, M = .11). Menu response 1 was also significantly more likely to 
be selected at each level of distance for repeated instances compared to non-
repeated instances: t(45) = 13.7, p < .001, M = .75, at a distance of 1; t(45) = 
7.85, p < .001, M = .49, at a distance of 2; and t(45) 7.37, p < .001, M = .44, at a 
distance of 3. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the likelihood of 
selecting response 1 decreased significantly as distance increased, F(2, 90) = 
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20.93, p < .001.  
 In contrast to menu response 1, menu response 2 was significantly less 
likely to be selected when viewing repeated instances (M = .16) than non-
repeated instances ( M = .32, t(45) = 5.59, p < .001). Menu response 2 also 
showed the opposite effect of distance compared to response 1. Response 2 
was more likely to be selected for non-matching than matching objects at each 
level of distance, t(45) = 6.76, p < .001 at distance 1, t(45) = 4.45, p < .001at 
distance  2, and t(45) 2.06, p < .05, at distance 3, (M = .07, M = .18, and M = .24,  
respectively). A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there was a significant 
effect of distance on menu response 2, F(2, 90) = 20.93, p < .001, with the 
likelihood of selecting this  response increasing, rather than decreasing, as 
distance increased.  
 Menu response 3 was also significantly more likely to be selected when 
viewing non-repeated instances (M = .15) than repeated instances (t(45) = 3.61, 
p < .01, M = .07). Menu response 3 was also significantly more likely to be 
selected for non-repeated than repeated instances at the first two levels of 
distance,  t(45) = 3.38, p < .01, M = .06 at a distance of 1, t(45) = 4.31, p < .001, 
M = .04 distance of 2, but failed to reach significance at a distance of 3, t(45) = 
1.04, p > .05, M = .12. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there was no 
significant overall effect of distance on the selection of menu response 3, F(2, 90) 
= 2.72, p = .071. 
 Based on these comparisons, it would appear that menu response 1 is the 
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most valid indicator of stage 1 sampling effects, because only response 1 was 
chosen more often for matching than non-matching objects. Responses 2 and 3 
are actually selected less often for matching objects, and the probability of 
selecting those response increased with distance for matching objects 
(significantly so for response 2). Given these findings, further analyses will focus 
on menu response 1 as the primary measure of stage 1 sampling.  
 
Distance Effects 
 The effect of distance on labeling was analyzed by comparing the 
probability of giving the second instance in a matching pair the same species 
label as the first across our three conditions (distance of 1, 2, or 3).  This data is 
shown in Figure 9. At a distance of 1 (meaning that the second identical object 
appeared immediately after the first) the probability of giving both objects the 
same label was approximately 47%, while at a distance of two the probability was 
33% and at a distance of three it was 28%. A one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA indicated that distance had a significant effect on the labeling of identical 
objects, F(2, 90) = 10.38, p < .001. Trend analysis indicated significant support 
for a linear trend, F(1, 45) = 18.73, p < .001. No support for a quadratic trend was 
found, F(1, 45) = 1.43, p = .239. Pairwise comparisons indicated that there was a 
significant difference between the probabilities at a distance of one to two, MD = 
.138, p = .016, and a distance of one to three, MD = .188, p < .001. However the 
difference in probability between a distance of two and three was not significant, 
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MD = .051, p = .542. 
 The effect of distance on menu responses was analyzed in a manner 
similar to that of the label data. We were interested in whether people would refer 
back to a specific previous object (the first matching object) when labeling the 
current (second matching) object. Given that only menu response 1 was a valid 
indicator of sampling the first matching object (see discussion above), menu 
response 1 will be the focus of the following discussion. The significant overall 
ANOVA for this measure has already been discussed above.  In addition, trend 
analyses indicated significant support for both linear, (F(1, 45) = 33.41, p < .001), 
and quadratic, (F(1, 45) = 6.11, p = .02), trends in this data. Similar to the 
labeling data, pairwise comparisons indicated that although the differences 
between distance one and two, MD = .257, p < .001, as well as one and three, 
MD = .304, p < .001, were significant, the difference between distances two and 
three was not, MD = .047, p = .95.  
 
Label|Menu Data 
 P(Label|Sample), or the probability of giving a second identical object the 
same label as the first given sampling of the first, is of particular interest in this 
study because it provides a relatively pure measure of the stage 2 decision 
process. One obvious prediction of our framework is that, because stage 2 
(comparison) depends on stage 1(sampling) the probability of sampling the first 
matching object should exceed the probability of giving the second the same 
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label. Averaged across all levels of distance and counting only instances in which 
menu response option 1 was chosen,  the mean probability of giving the second 
matching object the same label as the first was approximately 36% while the 
probability of choosing a menu response that indicates specific similarity to the 
first object was 56%, a significant difference, t(45) = 3.88, p < .001. Overall these 
results support our general assumption that the probability of sampling should 
exceed the probability of labeling in this type of task.  
 The effects of distance on the conditional probability of labeling given 
sampling were also analyzed. When only menu response 1 was coded as an 
indication of sampling, the probability of labeling given sampling was 58% at a 
distance of one, 50% at a distance of two and 46% at a distance of three. A one-
way repeated measures ANOVA indicated no significant effect of distance on 
P(Label|Sample), F(2, 60) = 1.76, p = .181. Pairwise comparisons indicated no 
significant difference between distance one to two, MD = .081, p = .563, distance 
two to three, MD = .038, p = .999, or distance one to three, MD = .118, p = .376. 
Trend analyses found no support for either a linear trend, F(1, 30) = 2.48, p = 
.125, or a quadratic trend, F(1, 30) = .229, p = .635. Thus, the current results 
provide no strong evidence for an effect of distance on labeling probability, 
independent of its effect on sampling.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
 
General Discussion 
 Assessment of the participants' labeling data shows a clear sensitivity to 
alignability based categories. Specifically, participants were significantly more 
likely to give alignable objects the same family labels than non-alignable objects. 
Similarly, participants demonstrated a significant sensitivity to identity, with the 
likelihood of giving two objects the same species label being higher for identical 
objects than for alignable but non-identical objects. Overall the pattern of labeling 
data from this experiment was similar to that of prior full-set paper-and-pencil 
studies in showing sensitivity both to overall alignability and to matching surface 
features. This was true despite the fact that objects were shown sequentially and 
could only be seen one at a time in the present task. In that sense, the present 
results provide an important demonstration of the generality of our main findings 
across different presentation conditions. 
 The menu response data showed a strong sensitivity to the order in which 
objects were presented. The pattern of responses changed from the first 
presentation of a category to the second, third, and fourth. In particular, 
participants were highly likely to indicate that the present object was different 
from all previous objects when viewing the first object from a given alignable 
category, and typically indicated that they noticed some similarity to previous 
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objects thereafter. The pattern of responses when viewing the second identical 
instance in a matching pair was of particular interest in the current study. 
Participants were much more likely to provide response option 1 
("Identical/nearly identical to a previous object") when viewing the second object 
of a matching pair than when viewing a regular non-matching object. Although 
response options 2 and 3 ("Shares one or more parts with a specific previous 
object" and "Similar overall to a previous object", respectively) could in principle 
indicate sampling of the first matching object, participants appeared to reserve 
response 1 for identical instances and responses 2 and 3 mainly for non-identical 
instances. This result implies that menu response 1 is the only appropriate 
measure of whether participants are sampling the first object in a matching pair 
when labeling the second object. 
 The main goal of the current study was to examine the effect of temporal 
distance on participants' labeling and menu responses for identical pairs 
(specifically, the second example of each pair). The labeling data showed a clear 
graded effect of distance, with the likelihood of giving two identical objects the 
same label decreasing as their distance in an array increased. When examining 
the menu responses for those same matching pairs we found a similar effect, 
with the likelihood of selecting menu option 1 decreasing significantly as a 
function of distance. In other words, people were more likely to report that the 
second matching instance was identical to the first the closer the two objects 
were in the array. 
49 
 
 Using the label and menu response data, we calculated the conditional 
probabilities that participants would give two identical objects the same label 
given that they had provided a menu response indicating sampling. As 
mentioned before, menu response 1 appeared to be the most sensitive measure 
of sampling the first matching instances, so that index was used for calculating 
these conditional probabilities. In this analysis we failed to find a significant effect 
of distance on conditional labeling probabilities. Thus, there was no strong 
evidence in this data that people are more likely to put closer than distant objects 
into the same species category, given that sampling has occurred in both cases. 
However it should be noted that the observed power when using only menu 
response 1 was rather low in the present experiment due to missing data and a 
relatively low number of observations per condition, and this may have 
contributed to our non-significant effect.  
 
Implications for the Models 
 A primary focus of this study has been to determine the involvement of 
both stage 1 (sampling) and stage 2 (comparison-decision) effects on 
categorization. The present results clearly provide strong evidence supporting 
stage 1 involvement. Specifically people were more likely to mention the first 
identical instance, via menu response, when the distance between the two 
objects was less. At a distance of 1 there was a 75% probability of mentioning 
the first identical instance and this probability dropped to 49% at a distance of 2 
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and 44% at a distance of 3. Given the increased temporal delay as distance in 
the array is increased from 1 to 2 to 3, it is not surprising that participants would 
be less likely to recall the first instance as a result of this manipulation. It should 
also be noted that the probability of using menu response 1 when labeling the 
second matching object in a pair was significantly higher than the probability of 
doing so for regular non-matching objects at all levels of distance, indicating that 
menu response 1 was a valid indicator of sampling at each level.   
 On the other hand, the present results do not provide strong support for a 
distinct stage 2 decision effect. Although the data did trend in the direction of 
such an effect -- specifically the conditional probability of labeling given sampling 
did decrease as a function of distance -- this trend did not approach statistical 
significance. There are several reasons why this might be the case. One 
possibility, of course, is that there is no actual stage 2 effect to be found. This 
would be consistent with an "all-or-none" model of memory reminding, in which 
people retrieve either a relatively complete trace of the first matching object, or 
none at all. In such a case, we would not expect the comparison/decision 
process to be affected by distance, only the likelihood of recalling (sampling) the 
first object. Another possibility is that the stage 2 effect is real, but was not 
detected in this experiment due to a lack of statistical power. A third possibility is 
that something about the present task or measures worked against a stage 2 
effect in this particular experiment. For example, while it was clear that menu 
response 1 was the only valid indicator of stage 1 sampling in this experiment, 
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the wording of this response ("identical/nearly identical") might tend to reduce 
differences at stage 2, simply because everyone who chooses this response is 
already indicating a very high degree of similarity between the two objects (e.g. 
consistent with the all-none model of memory retrieval discussed earlier). 
 
Evaluation of the Method 
 Overall the present task appears to provide a useful method for evaluating 
the proposed two-stage models. Although only menu response 1 could be used 
as an indication of sampling in this experiment, it did appear to be a valid 
measure of stage 1. In particular the likelihood of providing response 1 
decreased significantly as a function of distance and was higher for matching 
than non-matching objects at all levels of distance. Overall, the results imply that 
distance has a clear and observable effect on stage 1 sampling 
 Although we found no evidence for a stage 2 effect in this study, we 
cannot completely rule out such an effect based on the present data. One 
problem with our measure of conditional probability was that since the probability 
was dependent on selecting menu response 1, when participants did not select 
this option for a given object the conditional probability of labeling that instance 
became a missing data point. This resulted in a fairly large number of missing 
data points, lowering our statistical power and making interpretation of stage 2 
effects difficult due to the high probability of a Type 2 error. One possible solution 
would be to increase the number of displays each participant is shown in future 
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studies of this type. In the current study only three arrays were used. However, 
given people's orderly behavior in this experiment, it seems likely that a larger 
number of displays could be used in future studies to obtain greater statistical 
power to measure stage 2 effects. It may be the case that simply increasing the 
power of the design will enable us to find support for stage 2, still using only 
menu response 1 as a measure of sampling. On the other hand, if future studies 
included repeated instances that only share some features in common, i.e. in 
which similarity is manipulated as an independent variable, participants may be 
more willing to use responses 2 and/or 3 as well as response 1 to indicate 
explicit sampling.  
 
Future Research 
 As mentioned previously, one obvious next step in this line of research 
would be to manipulate the degree of similarity between matching objects as in 
some of the studies described in the Introduction, using the current sequential 
procedure. Given the significant effect of distance in the current study, it would 
also make sense to manipulate similarity and distance orthogonally in a factorial 
design to assess the interaction between these variables in relation to stage 1 
and 2 effects. However one issue to be addressed in such studies would be how 
stage 1 sampling would change when objects share some, but not all, of their 
features. One concern is that if matching pairs do not share complete identity 
participants might become less likely to use menu option 1 to refer back to the 
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first object. Several strategies could be used to address this issue. One would be 
to return to the free verbal protocols used in the pilot version of the current study. 
In this case, participants would be allowed to freely respond to a prompt asking 
them to justify their labeling of the current object in relation to previous objects. 
The main problem with this strategy would be the difficultly of interpreting 
people's sometimes ambiguous responses and the extra time needed to code 
and interpret verbal recordings. However, the results found in our pilot study 
suggest that these would not be insurmountable obstacles. Another option would 
be to attempt to develop new menu response options that may provide better 
indices of sampling under varying degrees of similarity. As with the current study, 
we could model such new menu options on the types of verbal responses 
obtained in a pilot study using verbal protocols and explicitly varying level of 
match. It might also be possible to change the overall instructions in such a way 
that people become more willing to use menu options 2 and 3 to indicate 
sampling, at least in cases of less-than-total feature overlap. 
 
Wider Implications 
 The present experiment investigates what is arguably the first step in any 
act of free categorization, namely, putting two novel objects into their own novel 
category. Compared to other models of categorization, one particularly 
interesting implication of the present framework stems from the notion of 
sampling as an all-or-none discrete event. The most interesting thing about such 
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an event is that it may never occur at all. In this case a person may simply fail to 
compare two objects and hence to assimilate them into the same category, even 
if they are highly similar. This assumption that free categorization depends on an 
all-or-none matching or reminding event stands in sharp contrast to many models 
that assume objects are automatically related to relevant existing memories and 
categories (e.g., connectionist models such as those of J.A. Anderson, 1997, 
McClellend & Rumelhart, 1985, and many others). 
 The two stage model of categorization proposed here is in many ways 
reminiscent of models of another important comparison-based process, 
specifically that of recognizing abstract analogies (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 
1993; Markman & Gentner, 1997; Gentner & Markman, 1997). Like the present 
model of categorization, models of analogy typically distinguish two major stages 
of the comparison process, commonly referred to as retrieval versus mapping 
(Gentner & Forbus, 2011). In the retrieval stage, a previously encountered 
analog is retrieved from memory based on its relevance to the current situation. 
Then during the mapping stage the two situations are compared and any 
structural alignability is assessed. Importantly, these two stages are affected 
differently by certain independent variables. In particular, the retrieval stage 
appears to be mainly affected by obvious surface features shared by two objects, 
events, or situations, whereas the mapping stage is mainly affected by any 
abstract (deep) structural alignability that may exist between them. The relevance 
of this type of model to our two-stage framework seems fairly obvious. In 
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particular, the stages of retrieval and mapping can be associated with our 
sampling and decision stages, respectively. This suggests, for example, that 
stage 1 sampling might be determined more by individually salient, attention-
grabbing features or contextual cues, while stage 2 is determined more by the 
overall similarity (alignability) of the target objects. Our task provides a useful 
method for attempting to distinguish these two stages, at least in the context of 
visual categorization. Future studies manipulating the number of matching 
features will be of particular interest in relation to this framework, because we will 
be able to study the interaction of similarity and distance in their effects on the 
sampling versus decision stages of free categorization. Hopefully such methods 
will help us answer many questions about free categorization in future research, 
in particular the interaction between our different stages and the relationship 
between categorization and other comparison-based processes such as analogy.  
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APPENDIX A 
LABELING INSTRUCTIONS 
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APPENDIX B 
LABELING SAMPLE PAGE 
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Images adapted from: 
Haeckel, E. (2005). Art forms from the ocean: The radiolarian atlas of 1862. 
Munich: Prestel. 
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LABELING SAMPLE PAGE (BLURRED) 
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Images adapted from: 
Haeckel, E. (2005). Art forms from the ocean: The radiolarian atlas of 1862. 
Munich: Prestel. 
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APPENDIX D 
COMPARISON RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS 
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APPENDIX E 
EXAMPLE DISPLAY WITH RESPONSE OPTIONS 
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Materials developed in our laboratory. 
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Table 1 
Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson's 1987 Stimuli Representations 
Cateogry1 D1 D2 D3 D4 Category2 D1 D2 D3 D4 
Prototype 1 1 1 1 Prototype 0 0 0 0 
Member 1 1 1 1 0 Member 1 0 0 0 1 
Member 2 1 1 0 1 Member 2 0 0 1 0 
Member 3 1 0 1 1 Member 3 0 1 0 0 
Member 4 0 1 1 1 Member 4 1 0 0 0 
Note. For each dimension of these stimuli there are only two possible values; 0 
or 1.  
Medin, D. L., Wattenmaker, W. D., & Hampson, S. E. (1987). Family 
resemblance, conceptual cohesiveness, and category construction. 
Cognitive Psychology, 19, 242-279. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(87)90012-0 
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TABLE 2 
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Table 2 
Stimuli Display Designs for the Distance Manipulation 
Condition 1 
A1 B1 B2 C1 
B3 B3 C2 A2 
C3 A2 C4 A3 
C5 B4 A4 C5 
Condition 2 
C1 B1 A1 B2 
A2 B3 C2 A2 
B4 C3 C3 A3 
C4 B5 A4 B5 
Condition 3 
B1 A1 C1 A2 
C2 B1 C2 A3 
B3 C3 A4 B3 
C4 A5 A5 B4 
Note. Assignment of creature type (horn head, tadpole, box creatures) to letter 
was counterbalanced between subjects, creating a total of nine displays. 
Matching pairs are shown in boldface.  
Materials developed in our laboratory. 
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APPENDIX H 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. In Panel A, a set of artificial stimuli are
by Medin et al. (1987). In Panel B the same stimuli are shown in a mixed array. 
Materials developed in our laboratory.
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APPENDIX I 
FIGURE 2 
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Figure 2. Example of categories based on alignability (structural 
correspondences).   
Materials developed in our laboratory. 
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APPENDIX J 
FIGURE 3A 
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Figure 3a. An example of the type of display participants used  in Clapper's 
(2015) experiment. Instructions are shown at the bottom of the display. 
Materials developed in our laboratory. 
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APPENDIX K 
FIGURE 3B 
 
 Figure 3b. Display following labeling. Here, the three alignable categories are 
distinguished by different letters 
have been given the same species labels in this example.
Materials developed in our laboratory.
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APPENDIX L 
FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4. Display contains a matching pair for each alignability
Our manipulation of matching features can be seen on the right. 
Materials developed in our laboratory.
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APPENDIX M 
FIGURE 5 
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Figure 5. Panel A: Probability of giving an object the same species label is shown 
along the Y-axis, and the number of matching features are shown along the X-
axis. Panel B: Mean similarity ratings are shown along the Y-axis and number of 
matching features along the X-axis.  
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APPENDIX N 
FIGURE 6 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6. An illustration of
study. Note that the distance between each matching pair varies within th
display.  
Materials developed in our laboratory.
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APPENDIX O 
FIGURE 7 
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Figure 7. A stage 1 only (sampling) model is shown in Panel A. A mixed model is 
shown in Panel B. A stage 2 only (decision) model is shown in Panel C.  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
-2 -1 0
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Distance
P(Sample)
P(Label)
P(Label|Sample)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
-2 -1 0
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Distance
P(Sample)
P(Label)
P(Label|Sample)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
-2 -1 0
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
Distance
P(Sample)
P(Label)
P(Label|Sample)
A) 
B) 
C) 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX P 
FIGURE 8 
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Figure 8. Mean probabilities of choosing each of the five menu responses shown 
across the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th non-repeated objects in an alignable category.  
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APPENDIX Q 
FIGURE 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
 
 
Figure 9. A graph of the probabilities from the current study. The P(Sample) and 
P(Label|Sample) shown here were calculated with only menu response 1 
included as a measure of sampling. 
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